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Negligence and the First Amendment: A Note
on the Destructive Assembly
Events during the last decade have borne out the prediction that
the streets would be a primary forum for protest movements.1 As
the focus of the complaints has switched from local to national issues,
the demonstrations themselves have become national phenomena,
attracting hundreds of thousands of participants throughout the
country.2 During the 1960's the Supreme Court has had ample op-
portunity to reconsider the problems raised by speech in public places
and it does not appear to have disavowed the view that the streets
are a proper forum for protest. The states have thus been precluded
from completely prohibiting the use of the streets for protest activ-
ities; prior to an assembly, regulations of only the time, place, and
manner of the assembly are permitted.3 In addition, the Court has
imposed limitations on state regulations of the protest once it is in
progress. The Court has reversed the convictions of demonstrators
who were arrested because their assemblies have attracted hostile
audiences threatening violence.4 It has pointed out that "' . . . con-
1 See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1964 SUP. CT.
R '. 1, 2.
2 Compare the crowds which protested local discrimination in Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) and in Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963) with
the crowds protesting the Vietnam War in Washington, D.C., in November 1969.
3 It has been suggested that the Court's condonation of state regulation of the time,
place, and manner of assemblies, Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), is the start-
ing point for a broad distinction between the constitutional protections for "pure
speech" and "speech plus." In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 at 555 (1965), Justice
Goldberg, speaking for the Court, said that:
We emphatically reject the notion . . . that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas
by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways,
as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.
Justice Black, in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 at 578-9 (1965), would apparently
carry this distinction even further and permit states to bar all assemblies from their
streets. For a discussion of the doctrinal difficulties with the distinction and a suggestion
that "speech" and "speech plus" are both subject to similar convenience regulations,
see Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, supra note 1.
4 The Court's limitation of state regulation of assemblies in progress is typified by
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). In Terminiello, the Court reversed the
conviction of a speaker whose antisemitic speech had further inflamed an already tur-
bulent assembly consisting of both supporters and opponents of the defendant's views.
The jury was instructed to find the defendant guilty if it found that the defendant had
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stitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their
assertion or exercise,' "5 and it has been suggested that in such situa-
tions the state should restrain the crowd and not the speaker., Only
when the location of the protest has shifted from the streets and
parks to other less "public" places has the Court removed much of the
protection of the first amendment and permitted more substantial
state regulation.7
The destruction which with increasing frequency accompanies
otherwise peaceable street assemblies raises an additional first amend-
ment question which is closely related to those previously considered
by the Court: If the Court believes that the first amendment for-
bids the state to prohibit street assemblies altogether or to break up
assemblies which have attracted threatening crowds, to what extent
will the Court limit the right of one injured during an unruly as-
sembly to sue the political group that organized the protest? The
issue is whether in protecting the individual's interest in his person
and property, the Court will give him a veto power over the general
discussion." Unlike the other restrictions on assemblies considered
by the Court-restrictions directed at conduct within the scope of
the first amendment-the law of torts was not designed for the pur-
pose of limiting the exercise of speech in public places. If the Court
is to curtail the right of a wrongfully injured party to recover damages
stirred the public to anger, invited dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. The
Court found, id. at 4-5, that a conviction resting on any of those grounds could not stand:
The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free
discussion .... Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of govern-
ment is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction ...or even stirs people to
anger.
See also Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Note, Freedom of Speech and
Assembly: The Problem of the Hostile Audience, 49 CoLUm. L. REv. 1118 (1949). But see
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
5 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US. 536, 551 (1965) citing Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526,
535 (1963).
6 See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 326-7 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
7 In Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), the Court upheld the conviction of thirty-
two student demonstrators who "sang hymns and danced" to protest the arrest of other
civil rights workers. The Court found their conduct analogous to that of the demonstra-
tors in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), which the Court had termed an
exercise of "constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form" when reversing
the South Carolina convictions. 372 U.S. at 235. The activity in Adderly lost the pro-
tection accorded the activity in Edwards when the location of the protest moved from the
state capitol, "[t]raditionally . . .open to the public," to a jail, which is not. 385 U.S.
at 41.
8 This is a paraphrase of Professor Kalven's statement of the first amendment libel
problem. See Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust and Wide-Open"--A Note on Free Speech
and the Warren Court, 67 Mica. L. Rsv. 289, 297 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Free Speech].
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from a defendant engaged in organizing an assembly, the defendant
must demonstrate why his activity should be judged differently from
the tortious conduct of others.
In the recent case of Maxwell v. SCLC,9 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered a suit by one injured
during a disorderly assembly against the organizers of the assembly.
The court's opinion inadequately analyzed the relationship of the
first amendment to the liability of the defendantO in reversing-on
a "close question of proximate cause"--the district court's decision
that the injury was the result of the defendant-civil rights group's
negligence. 1 The district court decision had proceeded on the theory
that an act may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize
that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through
the negligent, reckless, or intentional conduct of a third person.12
The liability of politically oriented groups to substantial damages
in situations analogous to the factual setting of SCLC is largely a
function of the scope of the duty imposed on them. The extent to
which the Supreme Court would find that the first amendment re-
quires an alteration of normal tort liability when the defendant is
engaged in the exercise of free expression depends on a reconciliation
of two different approaches taken by the Court to the susceptibility
of first amendment actors to general rules of law.' 3
9 414 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1969).
10 The court rejected the defendant's contention that the first amendment would alter
his standard of care. "If there is liability under a proper application of sound tort
principles, the stated objectives of the defendant . . .will be of no consequence. The
First Amendment is simply not involved in this case." 414 F.2d at 1067.
11 The complicated fact situation in the case makes one hesitant to assume that the
court used proximate cause as a "device" to free the defendant from liability without
requiring discussion of a complex problem. The SCLO (Southern Christian Leadership
Conference) was picketing a store which allegedly had a discriminatory hiring policy
and in which customers had allegedly been harassed by store policemen. Part of the
picket line broke away and started to rock a stopped car. The enraged motorist emerged,
fired two volleys from a pistol and, on the second, injured Maxwell, an observer of the
demonstration who had placed himself in a vulnerable position after the first burst of
gunfire.
12 414 F.2d at 1068. See REsrATEmENT OF TORTS §§ 302A, 302B, 303. Comment d,
illustration 1, of § 303 gives a situation analogous to the facts of SCLC in which there
would be liability.
1s For this comment, it is assumed that the rule of law involved in the case was applied
in a nondiscriminatory fashion to the defendant. Cf. Kalven, The New York Times Case:
JA Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. RaV. 191,
196-7. Justice Black has suggested that an unequal application of state regulations to
different assemblies involves a violation of freedom of speech as well as of equal pro-
tection. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), he criticized a Louisiana ordinance
which forbades assemblies for all but labor unions. "[B]y specifically permitting picketing
for the publication of labor union views, Louisiana is attempting to pick and choose
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I. THE BIFURCATED APPROACH TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In various contexts the Supreme Court has indicated that first
amendment activity enjoys no immunity from a nondiscriminatory
application of general rules of law.14 An examination of these cases
indicates that the Court has taken a bifurcated view of first amend-
ment activity in attempting to reconcile society's interests in the dis-
semination of information with the state's interest in regulation. 5
By severing the expressive from the nonexpressive elements of first
amendment behavior, the Court has been able to focus on the latter
and, apparently, avoid constitutional difficulties. "Impositions based
on misconduct," it has asserted, "can be neutral with respect to the
among the views it is willing to have discussed on its streets .... This seems to me to
be censorship in its most odious form, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 581. Professor Kalven sees the merger of first amendment and
equal protection arguments as of "considerable practical importance." Kalven, The
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, supra note 1, at 29-30.
One analogous problem in the assembly area which seems to exist in Chicago involves
the requirement that groups post large liability and performance bonds prior to using
public parks. Such bonds do not appear to be required of all groups and seem to serve
little purpose save harassment, since the city has a thirty-four million dollar insurance
policy which covers any contingency the required bonds would cover. See APRIL 27 IN-
VESTIGATING COMMISSION OF THE AMERICAN CiviL LiaEaRs UNION, DISSENT AND DisoRDER
10-11 (1968).
Throughout this comment, references to "rules of law" or "legal doctrines" are made
without distinguishing between those embodied in statutes and those which are com-
mon law principles. The Court, in considering the immunity of first amendment actors
to these rules, has never adverted to any difference in terms of state interest between
common law and statutory law. Even the Court's concern for precision of terms has not
led it to favor one form over the other. Compare Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507
(1948), with Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
14 A business "is not immune from regulation because it is an agency of the press.
The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general
laws." Associated Press v. NLRB, 801 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (National Labor Relations Act);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 US. 1 (1945) (Sherman Act); see discussion at text
accompanying notes 17-19 infra; National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943) (Federal Communications Act); discussion at text accompanying notes
23-25 infra.
15 The bifurcated view suggested here should not be confused with the two-level theory
of speech which the Court has employed in several contexts. See Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). For a general consideration of the two-level theory in
the obscenity area, see Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup.
Cr. REv. 1.
The bifurcated approach discussed in this comment assumes the existence of ex-
pressive and nonexpressive elements in a given first amendment activity, e.g., newspaper
publishing, and finds no first amendment inconsistency with a regulation which focuses
solely on the latter. The two-level theory of Roth, however, assumes that some forms of
expression are so without social value as to forfeit any protection which the first amend-
ment might afford.
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content of the speech involved.., and adjusted to strike a fair balance
between the interests of the community in free circulation of in-
formation" and in the regulation of potentially harmful activity.1
Thus, in Associated Press v. United States17 the Court upheld an
antitrust judgment against the Associated Press which ordered the
members of the news-gathering organization to cease following by-
laws prohibiting them from selling news to nonmembers and granting
each member power to block its nonmember competitors from mem-
bership. Rejecting the first amendment defense of the Associated
Press the Court ruled:
Member publishers of AP are engaged in business for profit
exactly as are other business men who sell food, steel, alumi-
num or anything else people need or want .... All are alike
covered by the Sherman Act. The fact that the publisher sells
news while others handle food does not . . . afford the pub-
lisher a peculiar constitutional sanctuary in which he can with
impunity violate laws . . . . Formulated as it was to protect
liberty of thought and of expression, it would degrade the
clear and present danger doctrine to fashion from it a shield
for business publishers who engage in business practices con-
demned by the Sherman Act.' 8
Since the Court found that the antitrust order would not interfere
with the freedom to "'print as and how one's reason or interest
dictates' ",19 first amendment considerations were not relevant.
In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,20 the Court, though apparently re-
jecting the view that first amendent actors were liable to general
rules of law,21 seems to have based its invalidation of an ordinance
which taxed the door-to-door solicitation of the Jehovah's Witnesses
on the fact that the regulation infringed on the expressive element
of the defendants' conduct. The majority opinion focused on the
incidence of the tax. The Court distinguished a tax on the income of
a minister from a tax on his privilege to deliver a sermon. While
both involved the taxation of speaking for a fee, the distinction
between the two elements would permit the taxation of the former
free of first amendment difficulties. Since the Court found that the
distribution of religious tracts was itself a form of religious activity
16 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967).
.7 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
18 Id. at 7.
19 Id. at 20, n.18.
20 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
21 Id. at 115.
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whose "purpose is as evangelical as the revival meeting," the tax fell
as a burden on the expressive element of first amendment activity.22
Finally, in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,23 the Court
rejected the first amendment arguments of the broadcasters and up-
held the Federal Communications Commission's prohibition of cer-
tain contracts between the broadcasting networks and local radio
outlets which precluded the outlet from using the programs of other
networks and the network from selling its programs to competing
outlets.24 The Court distinguished these regulations which focused
on specific network business practices from any based on the "polit-
ical, economic or social views" of the broadcaster which would
appear to be constitutionally infirm.25
Similarly, it would seem that a determination that a first amend-
ment actor had been negligent in conducting his business or in en-
gaging in other nonexpressive activity would not vary as his "political,
economic or social views" changed. The conclusion that such a deter-
mination involves no conflict with the first amendment, however,
admits of one important qualification predicated on an approach to
the first amendment in apparent conflict with the decisions which have
adopted the distinction between expressive and nonexpressive conduct.
II. THE CHILLING EFFECT
A. The Concept
The Court in the cases noted above refused to immunize first
amendment actors from the application of general rules of law. Other
22 Id. at 109. The dissent, while not contesting the validity of the bifurcated approach,
indicated that it is a game that more than one can play. Justice Reed felt that the inci-
dence of the tax was not on the expressive element of the defendant's activity. Citing
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), he contended that Pennsylvania was taxing only
the "money-making activities" of a religious organization, which did not conflict with
the first amendment. Compare the discussion in the text accompanying note 25. The
dispute between the majority and the dissent focused on whether the activity taxed
should be classified as religious (expressive) or nonexpressive.
There is some indication that the classification of the Witness' solicitation as a religious
activity served to distinguish it from the solicitation of magazine distributors which, in
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), was held not immune from a city ordinance
prohibiting such solicitation. Justice Reed, who wrote for the Court in Breard, seems to
have rejected the argument of the dissent that the first amendment protects the solicita-
tion of subscribers as well as publication. Id. at 650. He seems to have followed his own
contention in Murdock that the regulation of the money-raising aspects of first amend-
ment activity is permissible. Id. at 642.
23 319 U.S. 190 (1945).
24 The chain broadcasting regulations are described at 319 U.S. at 199-209.
25 319 US. at 226. For another example of the Court's permitting the regulation of
the business practices of first amendment actors, see Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S.
103 (1937).
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decisions, however, indicate that this refusal is severely qualified. In
recent years, the Court has employed several distinct but related con-
cepts, which have collectively been termed the chilling effect,26 to
subject generally accepted legal doctrines to renewed constitutional
scrutiny when employed in the context of free expression. The Court
has furnished several "examples of legal devices and doctrines, in most
applications consistent with the Constitution, which cannot be applied
in settings where they have the collateral effect of inhibiting free ex-
pression."2 7
Though apparently unintentional, this "collateral effect" is assumed
to lead to self-restraint in the exercise of first amendment freedoms28
26 See Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLuM. L. R y. 808 (1969).
The different concepts might be termed self-censorship, first amendment vagueness, and
economy of means. Though each shares the general traits treated in the text under the
chilling effect, each can be distinguished.
In both the first amendment vagueness and the self-censorship cases, the Court is
concerned with a regulation "not because it is aimed directly at free speech, but because
in operation it may trigger a set of behavioral consequences which amount in effect to
people censoring themselves in order to avoid trouble with the law." See Kalven, Free
Speech, supra note 8, at 297; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). In the
vagueness cases, the problem is caused by ambiguous terminology, see the discussion
accompanying notes 41-44 infra, while in the self-censorship cases, some other fault is
found with the statute. See, e.g., the discussion accompanying text at notes 46-49 infra.
In those cases which employ a strict economy of means rationale, the Court recognizes
that the challenged regulation causes a similarly improper inhibition, but the regulation
is invalidated not because of the self-censorship problem, but because a different method
of regulation would serve the same state purpose and be less injurious of first amend-
ment values. See Kalven, supra note 8, at 299; Note, Less Drastic Means and the First
Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
In all three concepts the Court is in effect ordering the state to alter its method of
achieving a valid purpose so as to reduce the unintended, collateral effect on free speech.
27 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-1 (1959). "When First Amendment rights are
involved we look . . . closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable
by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer." Ashton v. Kentucky, 384
U.s. 195, 200 (1966).
28 An assumption is made at two different levels. First, the Court assumes that one
who is considering the exercise of first amendment freedoms is aware of state regulations
which might render his conduct criminal. Not only are most political groups sufficiently
concerned with state regulation so that it is likely that they rely on the constant advice
of counsel, but any other assumption by the Court would seem unreasonable in light
of the legal system's refusal to recognize ignorance of the law as an excuse for crime.
The second assumption is that this awareness will inhibit the exercise of first amend-
ment freedoms. If one views the Court as creating a presumption of inhibition, it is
unclear whether this presumption is conclusive or rebuttable. See C. McCoRMCK, HAN-
BOOK OF THE LAw OF EvimENcE 639-41 (1954). In one recent case the Court seemed to turn
the presumption on its head. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969),
the Court upheld the "personal attack rules" of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion which require broadcasters, after an attack upon the honesty, character, or integrity
of an identified person during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public
importance, to notify the person of the date, time, and identification of the broadcast,
1970]
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and has caused the invalidation of state statutes, 29 common law rules,8 0
and administrative procedures.8 1
In Speiser v. Randall,32 the Court invalidated a California statute
requiring noncommunist affidavits as a condition for a tax exemption.
As the Court construed the tax procedure, the burden of persuasion
of loyalty was on the applicant and the affidavit was not conclusive.
Without contesting the power of the state to allocate the burden of
proof or the normal placement of such a burden on a taxpayer seek-
ing an exemption,8 the Court found this placement improper in the
First Amendment context:
The vice of the present procedure is that, where particular
speech falls close to the line separating the lawful and the un-
lawful, the possibility of mistaken fact finding-inherent in
all litigation-will create the danger that the legitimate ut-
terance will be penalized. The man who knows that he must
bring forth proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of
his conduct must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if
the state must bear these burdens.8 4
to deliver to him a script or tape of the attack, and to offer him a reasonable opportunity
to respond over their facilities. The broadcasters complained that the expense and in-
convenience of the rules would "irresistibly" force them to self-censorship and that their
"coverage of controversial public issues will be eliminated or at least rendered wholly
ineffective." Id. at 393. The Court, apparently pleased at the availability of a contra-
dictory statement by the president of one of the complainants, id. at 393 n.19, rejected
this contention as speculative. Throwing the burden of proving self-censorship on the
broadcasters, the Court stated that "if experience with the administration of these [the
FCC] doctrines indicates that they have the net effect of reducing . . . the volume and
quality of coverage, there will be time enough to reconsider the constitutional implica-
tions."
This shift of the burden might be explained in two ways. First, the Court explained
in the opinion, id. at 388-90, that the first amendment rights of the listeners and the
scarcity of available frequencies limited the rights of the broadcasters and permitted
greater government regulation than in speaking or writing. Secondly, the specific regu-
lation challenged seemed designed to enhance the volume of controversial broadcasting.
While effectively increasing the expense to broadcasters of expressing certain views, the
penalty was not money damages (as in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
discussed at text accompanying notes 59-63 infra), but the airing of contrary views.
29 See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), discussed at text accompanying
notes 46-50 infra.
80 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), discussed at text ac-
companying notes 59-63 infra.
81 See, e.g., LaMont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), in which the Court
invalidated a statute which ordered the Postmaster General to detain all "mail matter,
except sealed letters" which he determined to be "communist political propaganda." The
addressee, after notification of the detention, could request that the mail be forwarded.
The Court found that the deterrence caused by requiring a request for literature which
federal officials had condemned as "communist political propaganda" rendered the pro-
cedure an abridgement of the first amendment.
82 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
8 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
34 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
Negligence and the First Amendment
While such marginal and unintentional deterrence may be permissible
with respect to the regulation of most criminal conduct, the Court
refused to countenance it when speech became the focal point of
the questioned activity. Court procedures to punish criminal speech
must be "adequate to safeguard against invasion speech which the
Constitution protects." 35
Although the Court believes that the method in which first amend-
ment activity is regulated will enter into the calculus of an actor
considering the wisdom of engaging in speech close to the "line
separating the lawful and the unlawful," not all state regulations
with a collateral, deterrent effect on free expression are invalidated.3 6
Only when the potential inhibitions on speech outweigh the state's
interest in regulating a certain activity in a specific manner is the rule
of law struck. Thus in Shelton v. Tucker,37 the Court invalidated an
Arkansas statute which required each teacher in the state school sys-
tem to file annually an affidavit listing every organization to which
he had belonged or regularly contributed money within the preceding
five years. The Court conceded the right of a state to investigate the
competence and fitness of those whom it hired to teach in its schools,
and the value of the information disclosed in such an investigation.
It held, however, that the breadth of the disclosure requirement and
the lack of confidentiality of the lists so jeopardized the right of asso-
ciation of every teacher as to invalidate the statute. "[T]his Court
has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate
and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more nar-
rowly achieved." 38 Since the Court balances the state's interest in the
means rather than in the goal of regulation against the interest of all
individuals in freely exercising a protected first amendment right
which may be deterred by the state's regulatory measures, the test
appears to be one heavily weighted against a regulation with an in-
hibitory effect on speech. The chilling effect doctrine, however, only
requires the state to readjust its method of achieving a certain end.
35 Id. at 524.
36 See Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CoLuM. L. Rav. 808, 822
(1969); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HAv. L. REv. 1451 (1968). See also Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 US. 1, 88-105 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 9, 125-34 (1959).
37 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
38 Id. at 488. In Shelton, the Court took the legislature's stated purpose at face value
when suggesting that it could be achieved through the use of a more precise method.
Professor Kalven has suggested that the law should be considered in the background of
Southern attempts to destroy the NAACP by forcing the public disclosure of its mem-
bership. If true, there was no proper method to accomplish this goal. See H. KALVEN,
THE NE go AND THE FIUST AsutmMmaer 90-105 (1965).
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Such a requirement does not suggest that the first amendment actor
is forever immune from conforming to that end.39
The Court has employed the chilling effect in two related ways
to discourage the unnecessary deterrence of certain methods of state
regulation. First, to permit a more rational evaluation of the con-
sequences of engaging in expressive activity, the Court has attempted
to eliminate uncertainty from the actor's calculus. This has added
a new dimension to the invalidity of statutes whose vagueness had
previously conflicted with the requirement of clarity embodied in
the due process clause.40
Thus in Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction,41 the Court inval-
idated a Florida loyalty oath which set a standard of conduct which
the Court found so vague that "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."42
After finding this violative of the "'first essential of due process of
law,' 43 the Court held that "the vice of unconstitutional vagueness
is further aggravated where, as here, the statute in question operates
to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively protected
by the Constitution. . . . '[S]tricter standards of permissible statutory
vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting
effect on speech, a man may the less be required to act at his peril
here because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.'-44
39 It has been suggested that the Supreme Court has used the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine in a similar fashion. The vagueness cases "purport to pass upon the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of means, invalidating a particular regulation with regard to those as to
whom it is indefinite, and because it is indefinite, and reserving judgment as to whether
the end sought to be achieved is achievable through more definite regulation." Note,
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 111
(1960). The vagueness syntax serves to indicate the direction state law should take while
avoiding questions of "ultimate power." Id. at 115.
40 Due process requires sufficient clarity of statutory standards so that an actor prior
to acting and a jury trying him for his actions could "safely and certainly judge the
result." Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927). See Note, The Void-for-Vague-
ness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note 89, at 67-69, and cases cited therein. It
has been suggested that the vagueness doctrine has served "less as a principle regulating
the permissible relationship between written law and the potential offender than as a
practical instrument mediating between, on the one hand, all of the organs of public
coercion of a state, and, on the other, the institution of federal protection of the in-
dividual's private interests." Id. at 81.
41 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
42 Id. at 287, citing Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
43 Id.
44 Id. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Ashton v. Kentucky,
584 U.S. 195 (1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
860 (1964). Compare Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 873, 377 (1913). The Court's concern
with the impact of vague, speech-related statutes on the decisions of potential actors is
demonstrated by its receptivity to the challenges to such statutes. The Court deviates
from the normal prohibition against raising the rights of others in permitting those
[Vol. 37:391
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The chilling effect has also been employed to provide "breathing
space" to first amendment rights.45 Thus, the Court has forbidden
the punishment of unprotected conduct, engaged in unknowingly, in
order to preclude the deterrence of related, protected activity. In Smith
v. California,4 the Court reversed the obscenity conviction of a book-
seller based on a California ordinance which dispensed with the need
for proving that the defendant had knowledge of the character of the
books he sold.47 The statute's invalidity did not result from its direct
prohibition of the sale of obscene materials which are not constitu-
tionally protected. 48 Rather, the Court found that the collateral effect
of the statute was to "restrict the books [the bookseller] . . . sells to
those he has inspected; and thus the state will have imposed a restric-
tion upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as
obscene literature."49 To prevent the collateral inhibition of the sale
of nonobscene material, the Court gave legal approbation to the
unknowing sale of the obscene. 0
A similar approach apparently guided the Court's decisions in the
Communist Party membership cases. In Scales v. United States,51 the
Court reiterated its position that one could not be punished for being
a member of an organization engaged in unprotected advocacy 52 un-
charged under an allegedly vague statute regulating speech to challenge the law's clarity
as to others. It has been suggested that this is necessary since those improperly deterred
by the statute will never appear before the court. See generally A. BICKEL, TH ILAr
DANGERous BRANCH 149-50 (1962); Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in
the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1961).
In addition the Court seems to have found that the mere existence of a vague statute
regulating speech provides sufficient injury to give standing to one who alleges an inten-
tion to act in a manner arguably covered by the statute. See Note, The Chilling Effect
in Constitutional Law, supra note 36, at 811-2; cf. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58 (1963). The Court has held that "[t]he threat of sanctions may deter . . . almost
as patently as the actual application of sanctions." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963).
These relaxed views of standing and the rejection of the abstention doctrine when
speech-related statutes are challenged, see Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), seem
designed to remove vague speech-related statutes as speedily as possible so as to en-
courage the exercise of first amendment rights.
45 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). "... [T]he Court's primary concern
[with the first amendment] has been to determine the extent of the right and the sur-
rounding safeguards necessary to give it 'breathing space.'" Curtis v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
148 (1967).
46 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
47 Compare the Court's concession that the absolute liability which it found imper-
missible in the first amendment area was permissible when applied against suppliers
of food, 361 U.S. at 152, with the text accompanying note 18 supra.
48 361 U.S. at 155. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
49 361 U.S. at 153.
50 Cf. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
51 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
52 "It was settled in Dennis [v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)] that the advocacy
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less, as in the section of the Smith Act challenged in that case, "clear
proof that a defendant 'specifically intends to accomplish the aims of
the organization... ' 53 is required. The Court found that the absence
of a scienter requirement would "engender an unhealthy fear that
one may find himself unwittingly embroiled in criminal liability" and
thereby inhibit the exercise of the right of association. To protect
associations on the borderline of legality, "the state may only seek
to root out persons with guilty knowledge of the organization's activ-
ities."55
B. Tort Law and the Chilling Effect
The law of torts provides a systematic framework for determining
the compensation of persons injured by the conduct of others. The
imposition of tort liability for particular conduct has fluctuated over
time, reflecting a tension between the law's desire to protect the in-
terest of the individual in security and its attempt to foster the
individual's interest in freedom of action.56 The public's "interest
in a particular act may be so great as to excuse.., negligent conduct."s' 7
If the chilling effect suggests the existence of a conflict between the
first amendment and the establishment of a traditional negligence stan-
dard for the assembly organizer, an alteration of the standard rather
than the complete immunization of those engaged in free expression
from tort liability might be the resolution.
A consideration of the application of the chilling effect doctrine
to the law of libel indicates the locus of conflict between a negligence
standard and the first amendment.58 In New York Times v. Sullivan,59
the Supreme Court overturned a $500,000 damage award returned
with which we are here concerned is not constitutionally protected speech, and it was
further established that a combination to promote such advocacy . . . is not such asso-
dation as is protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 228-9.
63 Id. at 229. Such specific intent is not required to find proof of a conspiracy. All
knowing association with a conspiracy may permissibly be penalized.
54 Id. at 229.
55 Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUm. L. REV. 808, 824 (1969).
See also Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
248 (1957); Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1962).
56 Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARv. L. Ray. 72, 73 (1942).
57 Id. at 89.
58 Only a brief discussion of the first amendment libel problem is necessary due to
the existing legal literature on the subject. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A
Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," supra note 13; Kaven, The
Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker, 1967 SuP. CT. REv.
267 [hereinafter cited as The Reasonable Man]. In The Reasonable Man at 275, the
author reached the apparently premature conclusion that "to a considerable extent, state
tort law is limited by First Amendment considerations."
59 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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against the New York Times for a false and defamatory statement it
had published concerning the treatment of civil rights workers in
Alabama. The Court, which believed that the threat of heavy liability
for libel would deter the dissemination of information, 0 sought to
limit such deterrence by altering the basis of liability. It invalidated
the rule that a speaker or writer had absolute liability for false and
defamatory statements. It held that "the erroneous statement is in-
evitable in free debate, and ... it must be protected if the freedoms
of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need to
survive . ... "61
To reduce the possibility that "would-be critics of official conduct
may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is be-
lieved to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having
to do so,"62 the Court held that the Constitution required proof of
actual malice-knowledge that the statement was "false or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not"--before a public official
could recover damages for defamation.6 3
In a related case, Time, Inc. v. Hill64 the Court explained why
a negligence standard provided inadequate protection for a publisher
0 Id. at 277. The Court pointed out that in Alabama, criminal liability for the conduct
engaged in by the Times would have led to no more than a five hundred dollar fine and
six months in jail, a penalty that contrasted sharply with the large damages awarded
in the case, an award which could be duplicated by others who could convince a jury
that they, like Sullivan, had been implicated in the advertisement.
New York Times appears to be the first case in which the Court found that the
chilling effect could be triggered in a private legal action. Such a finding may have been
made easier by the fact that the bulk of the damage award was punitive rather than
compensatory. The Court has not, however, limited its use of the doctrine in private
actions to those where punitive damages have been awarded. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
61 376 U.S. 254, 271-2 (1964), citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
02 376 U.S. at 279.
03 Id. at 279-80. In later cases the Court has expanded the class of victims which the
media may libel with a privilege. Not only public officials, but "public figures," Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), and those who thrust themselves "into the
'vortex' of an important public controversy," Associated Press v. Walker, reported with
Curtis v. Butts, supra, must prove more than mere negligent falsehood in order to secure
a libel award. In addition, the Court has never rejected the theory that it proposed in
Time v. Hill that the privilege is operative if the subject of the media communication
is "newsworthy." This theory has been criticized, Wright, Defamation, Privacy and the
Public's Right to Know: A National Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEXAs L. Rxv.
630, 632, 636 (1968). See generally The Reasonable Man at 378-90. This expansion indi-
cates that society's interest in the dissemination of information, not the impropriety of
seditious libel, is the primary justification for the privilege given the media. The latter
was, however, the seminal concept in the area.
04 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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whose liability depended on a jury's assessment of his actions. In Hill
the defendant had published a somewhat fictionalized account of an
incident involving the plaintiff in its advertisement of a play con-
cerning the incident. The plaintiff sued under a New York statute
that the New York Court of Appeals had construed to provide damages
to one whose name or picture was used for advertising purposes with-,
out his consent.65 The Court found that the New York courts permitted
liability if the errors in the article were substantial, without regard
for the scienter of the defendant. In applying the New York Times
malice requirement to the New York privacy statute, the Court ex-
plained that
even negligence would be a most elusive standard .... A neg-
ligence test would place on the press the intolerable burden of
guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps
taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name,
picture or portrait .... Sanctions against either innocent or
negligent misstatement would present a grave hazard of dis-
couraging the press from exercising the constitutional guar-
antees .... Fear of large verdicts in damage suits for innocent
or merely negligent misstatement ... must inevitably cause
publishers to "steer ... wider of the unlawful zone," . . and
thus "create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be
penalized." 66
By employing the conditional privilege of New York Times in Hill,
the Court indicated that the first amendment policy in favor of the dis-
semination of information superceded the privacy right of one who
had in no way sought to enter the public arena.6 7
By its insistence on malice, the Court appears to have rejected
Justice Harlan's argument, suggestive of the cases which distinguish
between expressive and nonexpressive conduct, that journalism, like
other professional activities of great social value, is subject to a duty
of reasonable care.68 This rejection of the bifurcation approach may
65 Id. at 381. The case involved a violation of the plaintiff's statutory right to privacy,
not defamation. It is possible that the Court will distinguish between the extent of
constitutional protection provided for false and libelous statements on the one hand and
false statements which invade privacy on the other. See The Reasonable Man at 270-1
and 289.
66 385 U.S. at 389 (emphasis added).
67 See note 63 supra.
68 385 U.S. at 410 (concurring opinion). Harlan's argument has only a superficial rela-
tionship to the bifurcation cases. Under these cases the research aspect would be con-
sidered apart from the content of the article. The standard of care would presumably be
the same regardless of the "political, economic or social views" of the publisher. Justice
Harlan, however, would create an elaborate scheme in which the standard of care shifts
as the nature of the article and the public position of the subject change. See The Rea-
sonable Man at 298-9.
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have been based on the Court's apparent perception in the libel
cases that a judgment on the reasonableness of an author's research
was dependent upon the nature of the product: the more critical
or controversial the article, the more the author should be concerned
with the truth or falsity of his charge. 69 The Court feared that the
threat of heavy liability for slight errors in research would lead to
a reduction in that type of publication most likely to lead to liability-
the critical and controversial. Just as the Court found it necessary
to give legal sanction to the negligently false statement in order to
provide sufficient protection to the critic, it seems likely to find that
an intolerable deterrence of peaceable assemblies would result from
the punishment of the negligently destructive demonstration.70
In a suit similar to SCLC, the Court would examine the assembly
organizer's preparations as it has examined the publisher's regard for
the truth or falsity of his charges. The propriety of the timing and
placement of the assembly,71 of the arrangements made with city
police officials, 72 and of the communications from the organizers to the
69 See the discussion of the Saturday Evening Post's research for its story on the
University of Georgia Athletic Director, Wally Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 156-8.
70 In the libel cases, the Court seemed to ignore the possibility of viewing the problem
as one of insurance. The balance between the desire to safeguard first amendment activity
and the need to protect personal reputations might appear to be tipped by the fact that
a newspaper could more easily insure against the damages resulting from a libelous state-
ment than could the victim. With insurance, the publisher is in effect translating the
possibility of substantial damages into a relatively small and certain premium.
It is difficult, however, to speculate on the effect insurance would have on the deterrence
of controversiality that would otherwise exist, and the Court may have been reluctant to
let the insurance question alter a result apparently dictated by the first amendment. See
generally Weiler, Defamation, Enterprise Liability and Freedom of Speech, 17 ToRoNTo L.
Rv. 278 (1967); Reasonable Man at 302 n.104. The unwillingness to speculate on the im-
pact of insurance on first amendment activity would very likely lead the Court to ignore
the possibility of insurance in the context of the destructive assembly. In addition, it is
not as dear as in the libel cases that the first amendment actor here is better able to
insure against the risk. Unlike the injuries caused to victims of libels, injuries to person
and property resulting from destructive assemblies are frequently insured against by the
victims.
71 See note 4 supra.
72 As the issue espoused at an assembly changes, so will the foreseeability of third-party
conduct and the need to guard against such conduct. Certain assemblies seem more
likely than others to generate violent opposition or to attract disorderly support.
Preparations with the police prior to the assembly might include notifying them of the
potential number of participants and discovering how the police will react to certain
conduct, i.e., picketing by four rather than two abreast. If such information is commu-
nicated to the participants it may serve to prevent the surprise which often contributes
to a tense situation. If the demonstration is a large one, the selection of some of the
participants to act as parade marshalls and to assist the police in governing the demon-
stration may serve to reduce tension by reducing the number of face-to-face encounters
of police and protesters. See Transcript at 15243-8, United States v. Dellinger, 69 CR 180
(N.D. Ill., Feb. 20, 1970).
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assembly participants73 depend, at least in part, on the controversiality
of the issue espoused. An assembly organizer who must risk a jury's
assessment of the reasonableness- of precautionary preparations that
he has taken is as apt to cease activity which the state could not pro-
hibit directly as is the newspaper publisher whose plight worried
the Court in New York Times. To the extent that the standard of care
of a first amendment actor seems likely to affect his inclination to
espouse controversial doctrines, the chilling effect concept indicates
that it must be set closer to intention than to mere negligence.7 4
CONCLUSION
The problem of injuries caused by unruly assemblies raises the
question of whether the Court's limitations of state regulations de-
signed to reduce the use of the streets for protest will lead it to alter
normal tort liability for the assembly organizer. The chilling effect
cases indicate that the first amendment requires an alteration of the
normal negligence standard because the level of the duty imposed
will affect the content of the expression. A mere negligence test would
place on the assembly organizer an "intolerable burden" of estimating
a jury's assessment of the reasonableness of his preparations. The chill-
ing effect cases would, therefore, limit the scope of those decisions
which apparently permit the application of general rules of law to
the nonexpressive aspects of first amendment activity to those situa-
tions in which such an application does not depend upon consideration
of the expressive element.
73 By "communications" more is meant than the inflammatory remarks addressed by
the speaker to the crowd. Compare note 4 supra., Communication of an informative
nature would seem to be an important part of any assembly. Thus, an ACLU Committee
which investigated a disorder at a peace demonstration in Chicago found that the failure
of the city to provide a promised speaker system made it impossible for most of the
assembled marchers to learn the conditions of the parade permit issued. This ignorance
was seen as one cause of the disorder. See DISENTr AND Disoanax, supra note 13, at 20-21;
compare note 71 supra. If the absence of the equipment had been the responsibility of
the organizers of an assembly whose participants were apt to react adversely to the im-
position by police of unannounced conditions, grounds for liability would arguably be
present.
74 In the libel cases the Court failed to make clear how close to intention the standard
must be in order to provide sufficient "breathing space." It has been suggested that while
the Court theorized that all but calculated falsehoods should be protected, the standard
of care it ultimately proposed embraced "'reckless disregard of the truth,' a concept which
belongs to the negligence family." The Reasonable Man at 305.
An example of a situation in which the standard of care set will not inhibit the first
amendment actor's expression is the liability of a newspaper publisher for the injuries
of a pedestrian who slipped on ice which had negligently accumulated on the defendant's
sidewalk. Such liability is not apt to have that collateral deterrent effect on the exercise
of expression which has troubled the Court in the chilling effect cases.
